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Summary 
A review is given of several notable aircraft and aeroengine service failures investigated by the 
NLR since the mid-1970s. These failures have been chosen partly to illustrate the specialist 
knowledge required for determining the physical causes of failure, but attention is also paid to 
the broader aspects of structural safety and preventing additional failures. The selected failures 
are: Sikorsky S-61N helicopter rotor blade (1974); General Electric CF6-50 G40 turbine blades 
(1977-9); Air Tractor AT-301 propeller blade (1987): Aérospatiale Alouette III helicopter tail 
lug (1990); General Dynamics F-16 / Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-220 RCVV lever arm pin 
(1992); Boeing 747-258F engine losses owing to a wing pylon failure (1992); Westland Lynx 
SH14D helicopter rotor hub (1998). 
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Abstract 
 
A review is given of several notable aircraft and aeroengine service failures investigated by the NLR 
since the mid-1970s. These failures have been chosen partly to illustrate the specialist knowledge 
required for determining the physical causes of failure, but attention is also paid to the broader aspects 
of structural safety and preventing additional failures. The selected failures are: Sikorsky S-61N 
helicopter rotor blade (1974); General Electric CF6-50 G40 turbine blades (1977-9); Air Tractor AT-
301 propeller blade (1987): Aérospatiale Alouette III helicopter tail lug (1990); General Dynamics F-
16 / Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-220 RCVV lever arm pin (1992); Boeing 747-258F engine losses 
owing to a wing pylon failure (1992); Westland Lynx SH14D helicopter rotor hub (1998). 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The NLR is the principal aerospace research organisation in the Netherlands. The Structures and 
Materials Division, since 2004 part of the Aerospace Vehicles Division, has much experience in 
failure analysis, covering more than forty years. Most of the failure analyses, literally hundreds, have 
been for aircraft and aeroengine components, but many non-aerospace investigations have also been 
done.  
The present paper demonstrates this experience by reviewing seven notable aircraft and 
aeroengine failures and their resolution. The selected failures are: Sikorsky S-61N helicopter rotor 
blade (1974); General Electric CF6-50 G40 turbine blades (1977-9); Air Tractor AT-301 propeller 
blade (1987): Aérospatiale Alouette III helicopter tail lug (1990); General Dynamics F-16 / Pratt & 
Whitney F100-PW-220 RCVV lever arm pin (1992); Boeing 747-258F engine losses owing to a wing 
pylon failure (1992); Westland Lynx SH14D helicopter rotor hub (1998). 
The paper concludes with a survey of the specialist knowledge required for determining the 
physical causes of the failures. 
 
 
2. SIKORSKY S-61N HELICOPTER ROTOR BLADE (1974) 
In May 1974 a Sikorsky S-61N helicopter crashed into the North Sea with the loss of six lives. 
Figure 1 shows the aircraft type, and figure 2 shows the crashed helicopter during recovery. All the 
main rotor blades were broken, but blade 3 was exceptional in showing little deformation at the 
fracture location, which is indicated in figure 2. 
Figure 3a shows the recovered fracture surface of blade 3, consisting of a hollow spar made from 
aluminium alloy AA6061-T6. In service the spar had been adhesively bonded to an aluminium-
skinned and -ribbed pocket, as indicated in figure 3b, which also lists the failure sequence determined 
from fractographic analysis, /1/. The first phase in this sequence was high-cycle fatigue initiating from 
corrosion pits on the spar lower surface under the bonded area. 
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2.1 Contributing causes 
 
Inspection requirements for spar/pocket joints: Sikorsky had set permitted tolerances for disbonding 
(looseness) of spar/pocket joints. Within these tolerances there was no restriction on aircraft operation. 
However, the spar failure from fatigue-initiating corrosion pits under the bonded area demonstrated 
the inadequacy of the inspection requirements. 
 
Blade inspection system: Figure 3a notes that the spar was nitrogen-pressurised during service. This 
was part of an inspection system whereby early fatigue cracking would be detected via a pressure loss. 
In its original form this system comprised pressure indicators installed on each rotor blade. The 
indicators could be checked only when the aircraft was on the ground and the rotor was stationary. The 
NLR showed that this inspection system could fail to detect a crack until it had grown beyond the 
nearest pocket edge, /2/. This would leave only phases 4 and 5 of the spar fatigue life available for 
crack detection, see figure 3b. Quantitative Fractography (QF) showed that the total estimate for these 
phases was 2.1 – 4.3 hours, /1–2/, which is dangerously short.  
 
Design fatigue testing and analysis: At the time of the crash there had been twelve other spar failures 
in service. The various causes of failure provided strong evidence that Sikorsky’s fatigue design and 
analysis methods were highly inadequate, /2/. Also, the NLR’s fractographic analysis showed that at 
the normal cruising speed of 120 – 130 knots the fatigue crack growth rates were high, /1/. 
 
2.2 Remedial actions for other S-61N helicopters, /2/  
 
Spar/pocket disbonds: Detected disbonds to be immediately sealed with High Speed aluminium foil 
tape and repaired within two months. 
 
Blade inspection system: Dual pressure indicators on all blades and blade pressure indicators in the 
cockpit, allowing detection of pressure loss during flight as well as on the ground. 
 
Speed restrictions in flight: Any cockpit indications of blade pressure drops to be immediately 
followed by a speed reduction to 90 knots. This lowers the blade working stresses and extends the 
fatigue life such that there is sufficient time, well beyond the maximum flight time of 3 hours, for the 
aircraft to reach a destination.  
 
 
3. GENERAL ELECTRIC CF6-50 G40 TURBINE BLADES (1977-9) 
 Over a two-year period, from May 1977 to May 1979, the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 aircraft 
from several operators experienced 18 failures of uprated CF6-50 engines. Figures 4 and 5 show the 
aircraft and engine types. Figure 6 indicates the location of the failures, which were due to fracture of 
the G40 first stage high pressure turbine blades, all of which had been repaired owing to tip abrasion. 
Figure 7 shows schematics of a typical blade failure and the internal cooling configuration. The blades 
were made from investment cast René 80 nickel-base superalloy coated with a nickel aluminide. 
 General Electric investigated the problem in 1978 and determined that the failures were caused 
by blade overheating, resulting from changes in the internal air cooling passages during repair, see 
figure 8, /3−4/.  
 
3.1 Remedial actions (I) 
 
Owing to the then-known incidents, General Electric introduced the following changes in mid-
1978: 
 
Blades already repaired: A “set management system”, whereby each blade not only underwent 
individual airflow checks, but also had to meet certain criteria for satisfactory operation in a rotor set. 
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Blades to be repaired: (a) dry grit blast stripping of the external coating; (b) dump hole flow area 
reduction by brazing when repaired blades do not meet individual airflow requirements; (c) optional 
use of the set management system. 
 Despite these changes, several incidents of blade failure and cracking occurred in late 1978 and 
early 1979. The NLR determined that the failures were primarily due to insufficient thickness of the 
nose centre and convex wall locations, /5/. In turn, this undersizing was most probably due to ceramic 
core shifts during casting the blades and metal removal during repair. Important contributory factors 
were (a) the inability to check the blade wall thicknesses non-destructively before re-use and (b) 
General Electric’s finding that dump hole brazing could overcorrect the serpentine airflow. 
Following on from this, General Electric conducted a thermomechanical analysis of the G40 blade 
configuration and identified the four critical parameters directly affecting the blade fatigue life. These 
parameters were the leading edge airflow, the backflow margin, the serpentine airflow and the leading 
edge convex wall thickness. The analysis derived life reduction factors for all four parameters, see 
figure 9. 
 
3.2 Remedial actions (II) 
 
Improved lifing procedure: Based on the thermomechanical analysis results, General Electric proposed 
a new lifing procedure for new and repaired blades, /4/. This included leading edge convex wall 
thickness checks and removing dump hole brazing, if present, from otherwise satisfactory blades. 
 
Improved repair procedure: Coating stripping and recoating only at the tip repair location. 
 
Blade design: New internal cooling configuration, especially at the leading edge, to better cope with 
engine uprating. 
 
 
4. AIR TRACTOR AT-301 PROPELLER BLADE (1987) 
In June 1987 an Air Tractor AT-301 fitted with a two-bladed propeller experienced loss of a 
propeller tip in flight. The pilot managed to switch the engine off and landed safely. Figure 10 shows 
the aircraft about one year later, this time with a three-bladed propeller. 
Figure 11 shows the broken propeller blade and a detail of its fracture surface. The propeller was 
manufactured by Pacific Propellers Inc., under license to Hamilton Standard, and consisted of an 
aluminium alloy AA2025-T6 forging that had been chromic acid anodised. Despite the anodised 
surface, the propeller showed pitting and exfoliation corrosion /6/. The corrosion was most probably 
due to attack and penetration of the anodised layer by deposits, which included sea salt, /6/. The 
broken blade failed by  high-cycle fatigue initiating from a 0.1 mm deep × 0.3 mm long corrosion pit 
on the convex surface. 
 
4.1 Contributing causes 
 
Propeller cleaning: The operator neglected to follow the manufacturer’s recommendation to wash and 
oil the propeller blades after the last flight of the day. 
 
Operating environment: The aircraft was used for crop spraying near the Dutch coast. This resulted in 
aggressive deposits on the propeller. 
 
4.2 Remedial actions 
 
Replace propeller: The pilot was able to land the aircraft without further damage. 
 
Propeller cleaning: Washing and oiling the blades after the last flight of each operating day. 
 
  
NLR-TP-2009-001 
  
 10 
5. AÉROSPATIALE ALOUETTE III HELICOPTER TAIL LUG (1990) 
 In October 1990 an Aérospatiale Alouette III helicopter crashed in the Veluwe, a nature area, 
with the loss of the pilot. Figure 12 shows the aircraft, the A-351, which belonged to a demonstration 
team of  the  Royal  Netherlands  Air  Force (RNLAF). Figures 13 and 14 show the remains of the 
helicopter, which crashed owing to in-flight separation of the tail. Figure 14 indicates the Right Hand 
(R.H.) attachment lug fracture that led to loss of the tail.  
 Figure 15 gives details of the lug fracture, which was close to welds joining the lug into the 
airframe. Failure occurred by fatigue initiating from intergranular cracks on the upper side. The 
intergranular cracks were heat-tinted. Detailed investigation showed that they were associated with 
grain boundary films and rosettes of (Mn+Fe)S, and were therefore due to liquation cracking during 
welding, /7/. 
 
5.1 Contributing cause 
 
Atomic Emission Spectrometry (AES) chemical analysis showed that the lug was made from a 
medium-carbon (0.4 %) steel plate, instead of the specified 0.2 – 0.3 % carbon steel. This would have 
made the lug more difficult to weld into the airframe. The sulphur content was also higher than 
specified and hence facilitated liquation cracking.  
 
5.2 Remedial actions for other Alouette III helicopters, /7/ 
 
Lug chemical analyses: Small samples were cut from the ends of the Left Hand (L.H.) and R.H. 
attachment lugs of the 66 remaining RNLAF aircraft. The samples were analysed for carbon content 
using Energy Dispersive analysis of X-rays (EDX). One sample was found to have a too-high carbon 
content (0.4 %). 
 
Rework: The anomalous lug was replaced by another having the specified carbon content. 
 
 
6. GENERAL DYNAMICS F-16 / PRATT & WHITNEY F100-PW-220 RCVV LEVER ARM 
PIN (1992) 
In February 1992 a General Dynamics F-16 crashed between housing blocks in the city of 
Hengelo, without loss of life. The crash was caused by engine failure. Figure 16 shows the aircraft, the 
J-054, in its RNLAF livery. Figure 17 shows two views of the crash site, including the remains of the 
Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-220 engine. 
 Figure 18 indicates the location of the engine failure, which was due to fracture of a pin attached 
to a Rear Compressor Variable Vane (RCVV) lever arm. Figure 19 is a schematic of the RCVV 
assembly, indicating the pin fracture. The lever arm material was Inconel 718, a nickel-base 
superalloy. The pin material was Nitronic 60, a stainless steel. Detailed investigation showed that the 
pin had undergone stress corrosion cracking (SCC), /8−9/. Figures 20 and 21 show the pin fracture 
surface and evidence of corrosion and SCC. 
 The actual (physical) cause of engine failure involved a sequence of events, see figure 22. 
 
6.1 Contributing causes 
 
Pin material: The SCC susceptibility of Nitronic 60 was unknown, /9/, until identified by the NLR.  
 
Residual stresses: Cold-upsetting the pin head to attach it to the RCVV lever arm resulted in high 
residual stresses. The combination of these stresses and a concentrated salt solution in the crevice 
between the lever arm and pin resulted in SCC. 
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6.2  Remedial actions for other F100-PW-220 engines 
 
Pin material: Many more pins were found to contain stress corrosion cracks, /8−9/. The engine 
manufacturer changed the pin material to the nickel-base superalloy Inconel 625, which is immune to 
SCC in salt solutions, /8/.  
 
RCVV lever arm + pin assemblies: All Inconel 718/Nitronic 60 lever arm + pin assemblies were 
gradually replaced by Inconel 718/Inconel 625 assemblies. The “old” assemblies were subjected to 
frequent inspection until replacement.  
 
 
7. BOEING 747-258F ENGINE LOSSES OWING TO A WING PYLON FAILURE (1992) 
In October 1992 an El Al Boeing 747-258F cargo aircraft, the 4X-AXG, took off from Schiphol 
airport. Some thirteen minutes later it crashed into apartment blocks in a suburb of Amsterdam, with 
the loss of 43 lives and many injured. Figure 23 shows the aircraft some time before the accident, and 
figure 24 is a view of the crash site. 
 The sequence of events leading to the crash was as follows, /10/. About five minutes after take-
off the No. 3 engine and its pylon separated from the right wing in an outboard and rearward direction. 
The No. 3 engine hit the No. 4 engine, causing this engine and its pylon also to separate from the 
wing. Both engines and pylons fell into a lake about 25 km east of Schiphol. During the engine 
separations the wing leading edge was extensively damaged. Figure 25 shows the in-flight final 
situation. This damage and loss of the two engines made control of the aircraft extremely difficult. An 
attempt was made to return to Schiphol, but tragically to no avail. 
 Subsequent investigation of the accident involved many organisations, including the aircraft and 
engine manufacturers, the aircraft operator, airworthiness authorities, accident investigation boards, 
the Technion Israel Institute of Technology, and several NLR divisions. 
 The NLR’s Structures and Materials Division was assigned the task of investigating the 
components connecting the No. 3 engine pylon to the right wing, /10−12/. These components turned 
out to be the key to explaining this very complicated accident. 
 
7.1 Recovered components from the No. 3 engine pylon-to-wing connections 
 
 Figure 26 is a schematic of the recovered components from the No. 3 engine pylon-to-wing 
connections. Note especially that the inboard mid-spar fuse pin was missing, but part of the outboard 
mid-spar fuse pin was recovered. Macroscopic inspection indicated that the upper link and diagonal 
brace had broken away owing to overload as the engine and pylon separated from the wing. Attention 
then focussed on the mid-spar components, notably the inboard and outboard pylon fittings and the 
partial fuse pin, all of which were made from AISI 4330M, a low alloy steel. The inboard pylon 
fittings were made of high strength steel, 220 – 240 ksi (1517 – 1655 MPa). The fuse pin was made of 
medium strength steel, 126 – 139 ksi (869 – 958 MPa). 
 
7.2 Mid-spar pylon fittings 
 
  Figure 27 shows the mid-spar pylon fittings with summaries of the observed damage, /10−11/. 
From these results two main conclusions were drawn: 
− The missing inboard fuse pin must have failed such that the outer lug of the inboard mid-spar 
pylon fitting took the entire load at this connection and subsequently failed by tensile + bending 
overload. 
− During failure of the inboard mid-spar connection the male lugs of the inboard wing fitting moved 
outward from the throat of the lugs on the pylon fitting. On the other hand, failure of the outboard 
mid-spar connection resulted in the male lugs of the outboard wing fitting moving into the throat 
of the lugs on the pylon fitting, thereby causing scraping. 
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7.3 Outboard mid-spar fuse pin 
 
 Figure 28 shows a schematic of the outboard mid-spar connction with a cross-section of the 
intact fuse pin, and also the recovered fuse pin remnant, still in one of the male lugs of the wing fitting. 
The fuse pin broke at the thin-walled locations shown in cross-section. On the inboard side the fuse 
pin failed by shear overload, but on the outboard side it failed by fatigue followed by shear overload. 
Figure 29 shows the outboard fracture surface. Fatigue initiated at multiple origins along machining 
grooves. QF showed that the fatigue crack growth rates were probably high, /10, 12/. 
 
7.4 Separation sequence for the No. 3 engine and pylon and basic cause 
 
 Figure 30 shows the most probable separation sequence for the No. 3 engine and pylon. The 
basic (physical) cause was high local dynamic stresses resulting in fatigue and overload failure of both 
the inboard and outboard fuse pins. 
 
7.5 Contributing causes 
 
Fuse pin design: Less-than-optimum access for machining the thin-walled locations resulted in 
internal machining grooves (stress concentrations) that facilitated fatigue. 
 
Non-classical fuse pin bending: Boeing showed by Finite Element Analysis (FEA) that the fuse pins 
would bend under load in a non-classical manner referred to as “crankshafting” see figure 31. The 
crankshaft bending would have increased the stress concentrations at the thin-walled locations. 
 
Pylon design: At the time of the accident there was inadequate knowledge of the dynamic loads on 
engine pylons. 
 
7.6 Remedial actions for other Boeing 747 aircraft 
 
 Boeing introduced several changes for the pylon-to-wing connections, /10/. Figure 32 illustrates 
two of these changes: 
− A new design fuse pin made from corrosion-resistant stainless steel and without thin-walled 
locations. This type of pin is much more resistant to fatigue. 
− Two extra connections between the mid-spar pylon fittings. 
In addition, the mid-spar pylon fittings, the diagonal brace and upper link were strengthened. 
 
 
8. WESTLAND LYNX SH14D HELICOPTER ROTOR HUB (1998) 
 In November 1998 a Westland Lynx SH14D helicopter, the Lynx-282, lost a rotor blade and then 
the rotor head during preparation for take-off. The Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) crew exited 
safely before the airframe caught fire. Figure 33 shows the aircraft type. Figures 34 and 35 show the 
remains of the airframe and rotor head after the fire was extinguished. 
 Figure 36 is a schematic of the rotor blade failure location, which was in the so-called yellow 
arm of the rotor hub. This was a monolithic forging made from (α + β) processed and heat-treated 
titanium alloy Ti-6Al-4V, /13/. The rotor hub failed after 3591.9 service hours, whereas the overall 
safe-life had been estimated as 5000 hours minimum and 8600 hours at the failure location, /14/. 
Figure 37 shows the outboard fracture surface shortly after recovery, and figure 38 summarises the 
QF fractographic analysis results, /13/. Failure occurred by high-cycle fatigue, which initiated sub-
surface owing to the presence of a shot-peened surface layer. 
An extensive investigation found no evidence for failure due to poor material properties, /13/. 
However, fractographic and fracture mechanics analyses of the service failure, a full-scale test failure 
and ad hoc specimen test failures indicated that the service fatigue stress history could have been more 
severe than anticipated. This possibility was subsequently supported by a separate investigation of the 
assumed and actual fatigue loads and stresses, /15/, discussed next. 
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8.1 Contributing cause  
  
Inadequate fatigue design: The helicopter manufacturer, GKN Westland, found that a ground load 
condition, minimum pitch on ground (MPOG), had not been included in the rotor hub design analysis. 
Using the well-known Palmgren-Miner cumulative damage hypothesis, also used in the original safe-
life analysis, GKN Westland found that the MPOG load condition could have contributed up to 70 % 
of the total fatigue damage to the rotor hub, /15/.  
 
8.2 Remedial action for other Lynx helicopters 
  
New design rotor hub: GKN Westland designed and manufactured non-monolithic rotor hubs with 
bolted-on arms to provide multiple load paths. The material was changed to the β titanium alloy Ti-
10V-2Fe-3Al. The new rotor hubs were gradually introduced into the RNLN fleet. 
 
 
9. REQUIRED SPECIALIST KNOWLEDGE 
 Investigating the foregoing service failures required a broad range of knowledge and expertise. 
Figure 39 summarises the specialist knowledge and techniques used. Perhaps the most important 
points are: 
– The failures cover many classes of aircraft metallic materials: aluminium alloys, high and medium 
strength low alloy steels, carbon steels, stainless steels, titanium alloys and nickel-base 
superalloys. 
– Fractographic analyses were always needed. Fractography had to identify the fracture 
mechanisms, including fatigue, stress corrosion and overload, and take account of environmental 
effects. Whenever possible, Quantitative Fractography (QF) was used for fatigue crack growth 
analyses. 
– Metallography was usually needed to aid or confirm the fractographic analyses. 
– Chemical analyses were usually done to check on the materials.  
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Fig. 1 Sikorsky S-61N PH-NZD (aircraft type)
Fig. 2 Recovery of S-61N PH-NZC from the North Sea
blade 3
fracture
COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL
COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL
NLR-TP-2009-001                                         
16
Fig. 3 Recovered blade spar fracture surface and phases of the fatigue life
Fig. 4 McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (aircraft type)
1
2
3
3 4
4
5
5
Al-skinned
and -ribbed
pocket
edge of 
bonded pocket
phases of the spar fatigue life
1 – initiation: corrosion pits + fatigue
2 – thickness penetration
3 – pocket-sealed flat fatigue fracture
4 – flat fatigue fracture: pressure loss “detectable”
5 – slant fatigue and final fracture
25 mm
hollow spar nitrogen-pressurised in service
a
b
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Fig. 5 General Electric CF6-50 (engine type)
Fig. 6 CF6-50 engine failures location: first stage high pressure turbine blades
Turbine section
Fan section
Accessory drive section
Compressor section
section
Combustion
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dump hole
typical
failure
25 mm
mid-chord and
trailing edge airflow
leading edge airflow, WA
serpentine airflow exiting dump hole, WS
Fig. 7 Schematics of typical G40 blade failures and the internal cooling
Fig. 8 Relation between chemical stripping during repair and subsequent G40 blade 
 failures
repairs with chemical stripping of external coating
cooling hole size increase
rotor set with many high airflow blades
total airflow increase beyond limits
reduced internal pressure at leading edges and loss of backflow margin (BFM)
incorrect quantities and distribution of cooling air through leading edge holes resulting
especially in ineffective film cooling
higher temperature gradients at leading edges
increased stress concentrations
reduced LCF + HCF fatigue lives
premature fatigue cracking and failures
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Fig. 9 Life reduction factors for G40 blade leading edge airflow, WA ; backflow margin, 
 BFM ; serpentine airflow, WS ; and leading edge convex wall thickness
Fig. 10 Air Tractor AT-301 PH-CPR about one year after the incident
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Fig. 11 Broken propeller blade and detail of the fracture surface
Fig. 12 Aérospatiale Alouette III A-351 (arrowed)
25 cm
initiation: corrosion pit + fatigue
10 mm
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Fig. 13 Airframe wreckage of Alouette III A-351
Fig. 14 Separated tail of Alouette III A-351 and indication of the Right Hand (R.H.)
 attachment lug fracture
lug fracture
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Fig. 15 Details of the tail lug fracture, showing intergranular cracking followed by fatigue:
 DOF = Direction Of Flight
Fig. 16 General Dynamics F-16 J-054
15 mm
DOF
welds
2.5 mm
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Fig. 17 Crash site of F-16 J-054 and indication of the engine
Fig. 18 F100-PW-220 engine failure location: RCVV lever arm assembly
engine
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holearm
1 mm
Fig. 19 Schematic of RCVV and lever arm assembly, indicating fracture of the pin
 attached to the lever arm
Fig. 20 As-received fracture surface of lever arm pin
25 mmRCVV
bolt with 
self-locking insert
Inconel 718
lever arm
hole in
pin head
pin material is Nitronic 60
(Fe–17Cr–8.5Ni–8Mn–0.14N–4Si–0.07C)
pin fracture
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Fig. 21 Corrosion and stress corrosion cracking of the lever arm pin
Fig. 22 Sequence of events leading to the F100-PW-220 engine failure
z corrosion pits and slots running from hole in 
 pin head
z transgranular stress corrosion cracking (SCC)
5 μm 10 μm
salt in by-pass air deposits on lever arms and absorbs moisture during shutdowns
concentrated salt solution penetrates crevices between arm and pin
crevice corrosion, SCC and fracture of pin
mispositioned 5th stage RCVV
aerodynamic excitation of 6th stage compressor blades
fatigue failure of blade-retaining lugs on 6th stage rotor
blade loss and internal disintegration of engine
COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL
COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL
NLR-TP-2009-001                                         
26
Fig. 23 Boeing 747-258F 4X-AXG
Fig. 24 Crash site of 747-258F 4X-AXG
COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL
COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL
NLR-TP-2009-001                                         
27
Fig. 25 In-flight final situation of 747-258F 4X-AXG
Fig. 26 Schematic of recovered components from the No. 3 engine pylon-to-wing
 connections
Inoperative or
impaired functioning
Elevator
Spoilers
Lower
rudder
ElevatorAileron
Trailing edge flaps
Leading edge flaps
4
3
2
1
Engines 3 and 4 missing
upper link
side brace
fuse pin partial
mid-spar pylon fittings
fuse pin intact inboard side only
fairing
fuse pin 
intact
diagonal brace
fuse pin missing
fuse pin missing
UP
FWD
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Fig. 27 The lugs of the No. 3 engine mid-spar pylon fittings and damage summaries
Fig. 28 Schematic and remnant of the outboard mid-spar fuse pin from the No. 3 engine
 pylon-to-wing connections
z inner lug bent
z outer lug failed by tensile + bending overload
z scraping (arrowed) in throat
inboard outboard
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Fig. 29 Outboard fracture surface of the outboard mid-spar fuse pin
Fig. 30 Most probable separation sequence for the No. 3 engine and pylon
z inboard failure
 (1) Fatigue + overload of fuse pin inner thin-walled location
 (2) Overload of outer lug
z outboard failure
 (3) Overload of already fatigue cracked fuse pin outer thin-walled location
 (4) Overload of fuse pin inner thin-walled location
inboard mid-spar outboard mid-spar
wing lower surface
side
brace
1
2
3
4
10 mm
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Fig. 31 Fuse pin bending under service loads
Fig. 32 Two of the remedial actions for the mid-spar pylon-to-wing connections;
 compare with figure 30
z classical bending analysis z Boeing Finite Element Analysis (FEA):
 “crankshaft” bending
z new fuse pin design z new mid-spar pylon connections
bolts for connecting
to a wing fitting
wing 
fitting
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Fig. 33 Westland Lynx SH14D (aircraft type)
Fig. 34 Airframe wreckage of Lynx-282
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Fig. 35 Separated rotor head of Lynx-282
Fig. 36 Schematic of monolithic rotor hub forging, indicating the failure location
Black
arm
Red
arm Yellow
arm
Blue
arm
approximate
failure location
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Fig. 37 Outboard fracture surface of the yellow arm in situ
Fig. 38 Outboard fracture surface with schematic of fatigue initiation area and phases of
 fatigue life
0.5 mm
3
2
4
1
z schematic of fatigue 
 initiation area
10 mm
phases of the yellow arm fatigue life
1 – highly faceted sub-surface fatigue initiation in vacuo
2 – rough early crack growth in vacuo
3 – rough early crack growth in air
4 – less rough crack growth in air
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Fig. 39 Summary of required specialist knowledge and techniques
S-61N CF6-50 AT-301 Alouette F100 B747 Lynx
Fractography
Fracture cleaning
NDI
Metallography
Hardness
Chemical analysis
Testing
tensile
fatigue
SCC
KIc
HCF
crack growth
aluminium
steels
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superalloys
Fatigue
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